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ABSTRACT 
The cognitive operation of conceptual integration or blending as described by 
Fauconnier and Turner (1994,1996) includes the notion ofemergent structure, 
that is to say, conceptual structure, which is part of the blend and which is 
independent and/or inconsistent with that of the input spaces. Emergent 
structure is especially noticeable in counterfactual pieces of advice of the type 
Iflwereyou, Iwould..., which involve the construction of a mental space which 
is contrary-to-fact with respect to both input spaces. Nevertheless, as argued by 
Ruiz de Mendoza (1998), this type of blend-internal asymmetries and 
inconsistencies are litüe desirable from the point of view of cognitive economy. 
In connection with this observation, this paper attempts to reanalyse and explain 
the performance of conterfactual advising by adequately combining data from 
as many input spaces as necessary to yield implicated information. In doing so, 
our account is free from the cognitive cost which may derive from the need of 
making sense of independent (and contradictory) emergent structure. 
1. Introduction 
In a number of publications, Turner and Fauconnier have presented and developed the 
notion of conceptual integration or blending as a general, dynamic, simple cognitive 
operation used to construct meaning (see Fauconnier and Turner 1994,1996,1998; Turner 
and Fauconnier, 1995, 1998). Blending has been found to be pervasive in many áreas of 
human thought. One of the central characteristics of blending is that it may develop so-
182 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
called emergent structure, that is to say, conceptual structure which does not exist in any of 
the input spaces and which is only explainable in terms of tñe blend itself. On occasions, this 
emergent stracture may be inconsistent with tñe information contained in one or more of the 
input spaces. This is specially noticeable in the case of counterfactual claims. Nevertheless, 
as argued by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999), postulating the emergence of 
independent and/or inconsistent structure in the blend is not desirable from the point of view 
of the psychological adequacy of an account of conceptual integration. Blend-internal 
asymmetries and inconsistencies are more costly to process in terms of cognitive economy. 
In an attempt to overeóme this drawback of the canonical theory of blending, Ruiz de 
Mendoza (1998) suggests that it is possible to explain away apparently inconsistent structure 
by adequately combining data from as many input spaces as necessary to yield implicated 
information. 
In connection to Ruiz de Mendoza' s observation, in this paper we analyse counterfactual 
pieces of advice of the type Ifl were you, I would... Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 296) 
claim that an illocutionary act of this kind involves the construction of a mental space which 
is contrary-to-iact with respect to both input spaces. As is amply argued in section three, 
however, the understanding of the intended meaning of these utterances can be derived from 
the conceptual interaction of one or more metonymies in each the input spaces. Moreover, 
it is shown that this rich conceptual interaction explains the purported inconsistencies in the 
blend. The resulting account is free from the cognitive cost which may derive from the need 
of making sense of independent (and contradictory) emergent structure. 
2. Counterfactual blendings revisited 
In their paper on conceptual integration in counterfactuals, Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 
288 ff) consider the following prototypical instance of counterfactual claim: 
(1) If Churchill had been Prime Minister in 1938 instead of Neville Chamberlain, Hitler 
would have been deposed and World War II averted. 
Their analysis of this counterfactual claim is carried out in terms of the many-space model 
of conceptual projection. As is well known, the many-space model ofmetaphor or theory 
of blending differs from the traditional two-domain model (Lakoff 1987,1993; Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Turner, 1989) in that it explains many cognitive phenomena, 
including metaphor and metonymy, in terms of conceptual integration of information 
derived from múltiple mental spaces. In its most simplified form, the many-space model 
includes at least two input spaces (source and target) and two middle spaces (the generic 
space and the blended space). The generic space reflects some common abstract structure 
shared by the input spaces, which licenses the cross-space mapping between the source and 
the target. The blended space inherits partial structure from the input spaces and may also 
include emergent structure of its own. 
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Example (1) draws information from two input spaces. The source domain, in which 
Churchill is seen as a politician who openly opposes Germán Nazism in 193 8; and the target 
domain, where Neville Chamberlain is the Prime Minister of England who opts for a policy 
of appeasement, rather than one of open confrontaüon, towards the threat of Hitler's 
dictatorship in 1938. A third generic space grants the subsequent conceptual projectionby 
reflecting structure common to both input domains: politicians holding particular opinions 
as to what the correct foreign pohcy should be in a certain country at a given point in its 
history. Finally, the blended space consists of partial structure projected from each of the 
input spaces, together with some emergent independent information developed within the 
blend itself. The source domain projects 'Churchill' to the blended space. From the target 
domain, the blend inherits the role of 'Prime Minister'. Thus, through composition, the 
projections from the source and the target make new relations available which didn't exit 
in the sepárate inputs: Churchill is Prime Minister in 193 8. Finally, through completion and 
elaboration, further new structure emerges: Churchill opposes Germany's foreign policy, 
World War n is averted, and the holocaust avoided. The following figure schematises this 
conceptual operation: 
Figure 1. A many-space model account of example (1) 
The resulting contrary-to-fact space displays the standard features of blending as 
summarised by Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 287-290). It exploits and develops 
counterpart connections betweenthe two input spaces in a selective manner. The final blend 
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can be input to other blends (as when Margaret Thatcher argued that just as the Allies should 
have refused to appease Hitler, so Western leaders should reñise to appease aggressors in 
the war in Bosnia) and, as shown above, it seems to develop its own emergent structure. 
This counterfactual blend is impossible in reality. In spite of this, as pointed out by 
Tumer and Fauconnier (1998:293), the lack of analogy between the inputs revealed by the 
blend makes possible the effective cornmunication of a complex reasoning, namely, the fact 
that dictatorships and the negative consequences they bring about can only be avoided 
through open confrontation. It should be noted, however, that this literal paraphrase of (1) 
does not have the richness of meaning of the counterfectual blend. The paraphrase does not 
convey the persuasive forcé of (1), because it is not based on previous well-known historical 
facts. Henee the relevance of blending as a powerful instrument of communication. 
This orthodox account of blending has been recently questioned. Although the core of 
the theory is accepted, Ruiz de Mendoza (1996,1997, 1998,1999) has amply shown that 
there are two essential problems with Turner and Fauconnier's treatment of blended spaces. 
The first one is related to the claim that blends créate new idiosyncratic structure of their 
own. Asymmetries and irregularities are not consistent with the principie of cognitive 
economy. Since they break the addressee's expectations in unpredictable ways, they require 
greater cognitive effort to be interpreted. In this connection, Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) has 
argued that the apparent irregularities in the resulting blends can be accounted for simply 
by increasing the number of input spaces involved in a projection.2 The second problem 
stems from the lack of attention paid to the study of the constraints which opérate on 
conceptual projection. It is generally accepted that blending should be a principle-regulated 
phenomenon. Fauconnier and Turner (1998: 280) recognise the following principies 
underlying the process of blending: 
Integration: The blend must constitute a tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated 
as a unit. 
Web: Manipulating the blend asa unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections 
to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation. 
Unpacking: The blend alone must enable the understander to unpack the blend to 
reconstract the inputs, the cross-space mapping, the generic space, and the network of 
connections between all these spaces. 
Topology: For any input and any element in that space projected into the blend, it is 
optimal for the relations of the element in the blend to match the relations of its 
counterpart. 
Good reasons: All things being equal, if an element appears in the blend, there will be 
pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links 
to other spaces and relevant functíons in running the blend. 
Some comments are in order. To begin with, it should be noted that some of these 
principies are in fact a posterior} attributes. Integration, web, unpacking and good reasons 
describe some requirements which the final blend must fulfil, but they do not specify the 
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properties which the input spaces must have or the constraints which should opérate on the 
process of blending in order for those final attributes and/or conditíons to hold. 
The principie oítopology represente an apriori condition. It seems to be, however, a 
reformulation of Lakoff s (1990, 1993) well-known Principie oflnvariance, according to 
which metaphoric mappings preserve the image-schematic structure of the source domain 
without violating the inherent structure of the target domain. Moreover, this is not the only 
constraint working on conceptual integration. As noted by Ruiz de Mendoza (1996, 1997), 
there are also pragmatic restrictions placed on blending. One such restrictions is the 
Principie of Relevance. As a result of the presumption of optimal relevance, blending 
operations are expected to offer the addressee the máximum number of contextual effects 
for the mínimum processing effort. In order to achieve this, conceptual projection from the 
input spaces must obey at least the two following principies (Ruiz de Mendoza, 1996:236): 
1. No information which is inconsistent with either the central or any non-central 
intended assumption can be projected to the blend. 
2. Only the mínimum necessary information will be projected to the blend. 
Assuming that these principies are obeyed, the hearer is entitled to consider the first 
acceptable interpretation of the blend as the one the speaker intends to convey. 
Going back to example (1), it is now possible to offer an alternative analysis of it along 
these lines. The blend compües with the two principies just mentioned: only the minimum 
necessary information has been projected into the blend (i. e. Churchill as a Prime Minister) 
and no information inconsistent with the central intended assumption has been projected. 
This entitles the hearer to beüeve that the first acceptable interpretation is the intended one. 
Apparently, however, the projection from the two inputs creates a counter-to-reality space 
in which Churchill is Prime Minister in 1938, opposes Hitler, and the World War II does 
not take place. None of these events took place in real life at that time. Turner and 
Fauconnier would have argued that this is just inconsistent structure produced by the blend. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that we may interpret the counterfactural claim under 
consideration in this way. Upon hearing an utterance like (1), hearers intuitively know that 
the speaker is not suggesting that Churchill was once Prime Minister in a parallel world.3 
What needs to be explained, therefore, is how the hearer is capable of grasping the intended 
meaning of that utterance, namely, that policies of open opposition are more effective that 
those of appeasement. I would like to argüe that this interpretation is reached in two stages: 
(1) through a conceptual projection from two input spaces, each of which includes a further 
metonymic model, and (2) by means of the general inferencing capabilities of the human 
being operating on the resulting blend. Conceptual interaction of additional cognitive 
models, -metonymic models in the case that occupy us-, explains why counterfactual claims 
of this kind are not understood in their literal sense and, also, why, in contrast to Turner and 
Fauconnier's belief that the blend includes contrary-to-reality information, hearers are not 
puzzled by them. 
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My suggestion is that the 'Churchill' and the 'Neville Chamberlain' which are 
mentioned in the counterfectual claim are just the source domains of two metonymies which 
stand for two types of politicians: those who favour open opposition and those who prefer 
policies of appeasement respectively. Therefore, the input spaces would be organised as 
follows: 
INPUT 1 INPUT 2 
TARGET 






-opposc diclators openly 
-rcject appeasement 
Figure 2. Metonymic mappings within input spaces 
Churchill stands for those politicians who prefer open confrontation and Neville for 
those who would rather avoid provocation. Thus, what is being compared in the 
counterfoctual claim is not the acting of two specific politicians, but rather two general 
political stances. The comparison of ChurchüTs and Neville's political behaviour in the 
situationunder consideration (1938 England) would nave been impossible and counter-to-
fact, because Churchill was not the Prime Minister at the time. The underlying metonymies, 
however, license the comparison of the two opposing political views represented by 
Churchill and Neville respectively. Ifthis metonymic operaüons are taken into account, the 
apparent asymmetries and ktconsistencies of the blend are no longer such. Moreover, since 
both Churchill and Neville are well-known political figures of the European history, their 
use as source domains of the metonymies has some advantages. From the point of view of 
TARGET 
Politicians: Typc 2 
\ 
\ SOURCE 
Neville C. (PM, 
appeasement, 
etc.) 
- do not oppose dictators openly 
-prefer policies of appeasement 
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cognitive economy, they actívate the two types of politician straightaway. From a 
communicative perspective, together with the instantiation of the two kinds of politician, 
they bring along a wealth of rich connotations which derives from the personalities of these 
two statesmen (e.g. Churchill's determination and stubbornness). 
The rest of the information included in the blend (i. e. the iact that World War II would 
not have taken place and that the holocaust would have been avoided) are reached via the 
addressee's general inferential ability. If the kinds of policy represented by Churchill and 
Neville were opposed, and if the policy represented by Neville led to a war and a holocaust, 
then ChurchiH's policy would have probably given way to the opposite outcome: no war and 
no holocaust. 
In sum, as the alternative explanation of example (1) shows, the apparent asymmetries 
which emerge in the blend are far from arbitrary. They can be expected and accounted for 
by means of (1) a simple conceptual interaction in the form of a metonymic operation within 
each of the input spaces, and (2) the use of general human inferential abilities. 
3. Conceptual interaction in the understanding of counterfactual pieces of advice 
Turner and Fauconnier (1998: 296) rightiy point to the ubiquity of counterfactual blends. 
One área of everyday reasoning and communication which makes routine and largely 
unnoticed use of this type of conceptual projection is that involved in giving advice. One of 
the most common linguistic procedures for the realization of this type of speech act takes 
the form of a hypothetical conditíonal sentence which, according to Turner and Fauconnier 
(1998:296), 'requires intricate, orderly, and impressive blending to créate a counterfactual 
space'. In the remainder of this paper, I shall analyse several instances of advising to show 
that their alledged counterfactuality is largely illusory.4 In doing so, it shall also become 
apparent that an explanation of these examples along the lines suggested in section 2 is more 
consistent with the principie of cognitive economy, since in this way, the seeming 
contradictions which emerge within the blend are accounted for as the output of simple and 
recurrent patterns of conceptual interaction. Our study has been carried out on a sample of 
a hundred instances of pieces of advice of the type If I were you... The data have been 
extracted from the British National Corpus. 
Most instances of advising in the sample resemble example (2) below: 
(2) The doctor told him: "Iflwere you, I would just pack your job". 
The canonical analysis in terms of conceptual projection of this example can be schematised 
as follows (see next page): 
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Figure 3. Schematic representation of the 'canonical' blend underlying 
the interpretation of example (2). 
The blend creates a parallel reality wbich defies common sense: the doctor becomes the 
patient and quits the latter's job. The illusion of a counterfactual reality, however, is not so 
strong in an almost identical utterance like (3) below: 
(3) The doctor told him: Tf / were you, 1 would just pack my job'. 
The use of the fírst person possessive adjective in (3) hinders the creation of a counter-
to-fact reaüty. It is obvious that the speaker has not 'become' the addressee, but that be is 
just puttinglñmselfintheaddressee'sboots and consideringwhathiscourseofaction would 
be under those circumstances. The collection of data under analysis contains instances of 
these two types of counterfactual advice: in some cases the possessive adjectives and 
reflexive pronouns agree in person with the subject (I), while in others the agreement is 
established with the second person pronoun (you). Letus consider them in more detail: 
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Subject agreement 
(4) Ifl were you, I'd watch my step. 
(5) 'Maybe not, but ifl were you, Miss Williams, Fá make sure that / confined myselfXo 
facts in future, and the most pressing one of all is the fact that someone in this town is 
annoyed with you!' 
(6) 'Someone paid them good money, a lot of money, to do that... this so-called 'friend' they 
mentioned... so ifl were you, I'd be trying to work out who he is rather than getting on 
my soapbox.' 
Complement agreement 
(7) And, ifl were you, I wouldn't bother resting on your very dusty laurels. 
(8) 'Ifl were you, I would hop out now while you can,' Nicola said. 
(9) / shouldn't bother yourself ifl were you. 
The subtle differences in the use of possessive adjective and pronoun agreement inthose 
sentences has significant meaning consequences. Those examples which display 
complement agreement are perceived as more powerful and pressing pieces of advice. This 
obeys to the fact that, although in a kind of ambiguous way, they present the addressee as 
somehow involved in the carrying out of the future action. Examples (4) to (6), on the 
contrary, do not explicitly point to the involvement of the addressee in the predicated action. 
More important, however, it is to note the fact that the existence of pieces of advice like 
(4) to (6) suggests that the counterfactuality of If-l-were-you advice constructions is only 
apparent. In processing these sentences, the addressee, of course, does not think of the 
speaker as actually becoming himself/herself. Let us now explain in detail the cognitive 
operations which underlie the interpretation of those pieces of advice and which prevent the 
hearer from getting trapped in a mental space packed with contradictory information. 
The potential contradictions in the blend vanish simply by postulating a metonymic 
operation in each of the input spaces. Example (2), which is reproduced below as (10) for 
convenience, is analysed in this fashion (see figure four on following page): 
(10) The doctor toldhim: 'lflwereyou, /would justpackycwjob'. 
These mappings show that the expression Tf I were you...' is simply metonymically 
standing for Tf I were in your circumstances...' That is to say, the speaker pictures himself 
in the circumstances in which the addressee needs to decide on a future course of action. 
However, the speaker does not cease to be himself and that is why he can make use of his 
knowledge and make a decisión (i.e. to quit working). 
When subject agreement is involved, we find a similar metonymic operation which only 
differs from the one in figure 4 as regards the scope of the target in the second input space. 
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I have the necessary knowledge lo 
make the right decisión 
My círcumstances: 





You don'l have the necessary 
knowledge to make the right 
decisión 
Your círcumstances: 
You have to make a decisión as to 
whether quit a Job like yours 
Figure 4. Conceptual interaction in the interpretation of example (10). 




I have the necessary knowledge to 
make the right decisión 
My círcumstances: 




You don't have the necessary 
knowledge to make the right 
decisión 
Your circumstances: 
You have to make the decisión as 
to whether quit working 
Figure 5. Metonymy underlying the interpretation of example (11) 
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This is the case with example (3),which is reproduced here as (11) and which could be 
represented as follows (see figure five above): 
(11) If I were you, I would pack wy job. 
While example (10) emphasises the idea of 'quitting a job of the kind of the addressee's 
(that specific job may be too stressful, little rewardirig, etc.), in (11) the emphasis is placed 
on the action of just 'quitting one's job' (the addressee may be too stressed out and in need 
of some time to rest). 
The metonymic operation described within the blended spaces of examples (10) and (11) 
is of the same type as those found in expressions like He is an Einstein, where Einstein is 
the source domain of a conceptual projection which has as its target the well-known 







Figure 6. Underlying metonymic mapping in the expression He is an Einstein 
Further evidence againstpositing the creation of a counterfactual reality, as Turner and 
Fauconnier do, in these cases of advising comes from examples like number (12) below: 
(12) 'It's bis land. But ifl were you both, I wouldn't disturb the dead, very dangerous!' 
The use of the plural emphatic pronounyoH both precludes the building of aparallel reality, 
since a situation in which the speaker is transformed into two different people at the same 
time is even more difficult to imagine. In contrast, two metonymic mappings like those 
proposed for examples (10) and (11), in which the speaker stands for his own circumstances 
and the addressees stand for theirs, leads to the correct understanding that the speaker has 
not been transformed into anyone, but that he is just putting himself in someone else's 
shoes. 
192 Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses 
Let us fínish this discussion on the role of conceptual interaction in the interpretation of 
the illocutionary act of advising by considering the following puzzling example: 
(13) If 1 were you, I'd get in touch with me if sometning turned up. In a situation of that 
kind, you'd need someone who can keep a secret. 
If the previous analysis of examples (10) and (11) is applied to this utterance, we may 
paraphrase it luce this: If I were in a situation Hice the one you arefacing, I would get in 
touch with me ifsomething turned up. Still, the utterance does not make sense. What is the 
point in 'me getting in touch with myself in order to solve a problem? Our knowledge about 
prototypical human behaviour tells us that, if one is in trouble, one usually asks someone 
else for help. Nevertheless, the sentence can be made sense of by positing a double 
metonymic mapping: the first person pronoun me is the source domain of a metonymy in 
which the speaker makes himself stand for some of his attributes, namely, the fact that he 
is a trustworthy, reliable person. In turn, these attributes stand for the whole class of people 
who have such features: 
Figure 7. Double Metonymic mapping underlying example (13) 
In this way, the addressee is capable of grasping the intended meaning: Ifl were in a 
situation like the one you arefacing, I would get in touch with someone like me (Le. a 
member ofthe trustworthy, reliable class of people) ifsomething turned up. 
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4. Conclusions 
In the present paper, I have argued against positing the existence of inconsistent emergent 
stracture in blended spaces in the specific case of so-called counterfactual advising. I have 
shown that the apparent contradictions that have been attributed to counterfactual claims of 
tais kind can be made sense of simply by developing the stracture of the input or blended 
spaces involved. More specifically, it has been contended that the metonymic mappings 
which opérate within those mental spaces lie at basis of the understanding of these 
illocutionary acts. In addition, as has been illustrated, diese recurrent metonymic operations 
explain the fact that speakers are not puzzled by the apparent contradictions which are 
associated with counterfactual claims. Since speakers do not need to invest any time or 
cognitive effort in disentangling blend-internal asymmetries and inconsistencies, the present 
refüiernent of the canonical theory of blending represents a step forward towards the 
achievement of an optimal degree of psychological adequacy. 
Notes 
1. Financial support for this research has been given by the DGES, grant no. BFF2000-0934, 
Ministry of Education and Culture, Spain. 
2. Ruiz de Mendoza (1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) has reanalysed some of Turner and 
Fauconnier's most well-known examples of blending to show that inconsistencies are not such. 
They can be made sense of either as contextual implications or as the output of more complex 
cognitive operations involving a greater number of cognitive models. Example (1) is analysed 
below in this fashion. 
3. It should be taken into account that in the example under consideration, the illusion of the 
existence of a counterfactual paral leí reality is aided by the fact that Churchill and Neville both li ved 
during the same time span, and therefore, Churchill actually had a real chance at that time to have 
become the Prime Minister instead of Neville Chamberlain. An utterance like Ifl had been Julius 
Caesar, the Gaulles would have never been conqueren, where it is obvious that I was never and 
could have never been Julius Caesar, on the contrary, does not lead to the creation of a 
counterfactual reality so straightforwardly. 
4. This study has been carried out on a sample of a hundred instances of pieces of advice of the 
type Ifl were you... The data have been extracted from the British National Corpus. 
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